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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
worked the destruction of all legal vitality in the mortgage : Arm-
strony v. 3Iurhy, 2 Ind. 601; Sherman v. Sherman, 3 Id. 337;
Ledyard v. (Jhal)in, 6 Id. 320; Francis v. Porter, 7 Id. 213;
Bickle v. Beseke, 23 Id. 18; Lnclh v. Jennings, 43 Id. 276;
Ruse v. Duncan, 49 Id. 269 ; Boosevelt v. The Bull's Head Bank,
45 Barb. 579.
We think a demand to cancel the mortgage, as a condition of the
tender, is not different in principle from demanding a receipt as a
condition to the payment of money.
It would be the duty of the appellants, after "having received
full payment of the sum" secured by the mortgage, to "enter satis-
faction on the margin or other proper place in the record of such
mortgage," according to sect. 5, 2 Rev. Stats. 1876, p. 334; but
they could not be required to do so, merely upon a tender of the
amount, as a condition to their right to receive the money. The
section cited would not bear such a construction.
The judgment, as to the costs below, is reversed, with costs
here; cause remanded, with instructions to proceed according to
this opinion.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY.1
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.2
SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.3
SUPREM1E COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.4
ACTION.
Breach of Public Statutory Duty.-The mere fact that the breach of
a public statutory duty has caused damage does not vest a right of action
in the person suffering the damage against the person guilty of the
breach; whether the breach does or does not give such right of action
must depend upon the object and la-nguage of the particular statute:
Atkinson v. he lNewcastle and Gateshead Waterworks Co., Law Rep.
C. A , 2 Ex. D.
AGENT. See Officer.
Power to borrow Mone 3-Persons dea:ling with .Agent before Nrotice
of recall of his Powers.-A general power to borrow money includes
1 Selected from the late numbers of the Law Reports.
2 From A. N. Martin, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 55 Indiana Reports.
I From John S. Runnells, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 44 Iowa Reports.
4 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1877. The cases will probably be reported in 5 or 6 Otto.
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authority to give to the ender the ordinary securities for the sum
borrowed. Among these are bonds, notes or acceptances, and collaterals:
Batch v. Coddington, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Persons who deal with an agent before notice of the recall of his
powers are not affected by the recall : .d.
BAILMENT.
Deposit of -Property in Cloak-Room- Ticket - (londition endorsed
thereon-Knowlede of Condition by Depositor.-On the deposit of arti-
cles at the cloak-room at a railway station, a charge is made of 2d. for
each, and the depositor receives a ticket, on the face of which are
printed the times of opening and closing the cloak-room and the words
"see back," and on the back there is a notice that the company will not
be responsible fdr any package exceeding 101. in value. A placard
upon which is printed in legible characters the same condition is also
hung up in the cloak-room. The plaintiff deposited his bag, of value
exceeding 101., in the defendants' cloak-room, paid 2d. and received a
ticket. The bag was lost or stolen. In an action to recover its value
the plaintiff swore that he took the ticket without reading it, imagining
it to be only a receipt for the money paid for the deposit of the article,
or as evidence that the company had received the article, that he did
not read the condition at the back of the-ticket, nor did he see the notice
hung up in the cloak-room, The jitdge left two questions to the jury,
1. Did the plaintiff read or was he aware of the special condition upon
which the article was deposited ? 2. Was the plaintiff, under the cir-
cuuistanees, under any obligation, in the exercise of * -I * reasonable
and proper caution, to read or to make himself. aware of the condition?
The jury answered both the questions, in the negative, and judgment
was directed for the plaintiff: Held, by MELEISH and BA GALLAY, L.
JJ., that there ought to be a new trial, on the ground that there had
been a misdirection by the judge, inasmuch as the plaintiff could be
under no oligation to read the condition; and that the second question
left to the jury ought to have been, whether the company did that which
was reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the condition :
Held, further, by BRAMWELL, L. J., that on the above facts, it was a
question of law, and that judgment ought to be entered for the defend-
ants: Parker v. The South Eastern Railway Co.; Gabell v. Te Sarne,
Law Rep. C. A., 2 0. P. D.
BANKRUPTCY.
Jurisdiction of State Courts-Duty of Assignee.-The courts of the
United States do not have exclusive jurisdiction of suits for the settle-
ment of conflicting claims to property belonging to the estate of a bank-
rupt, and an assignee in bankruptcy may sue in a state court to collect
the assets. .McHenry et al. v. La Soci ete _Francaise, &c., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1877.
If an assignee in bankruptcy submits himself to the jurisdiction of a
state court in a suit affecting the estate which was pending when the
proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced, he is bound by any judg-
ment that may be rendered : Id.
The assignee is not required to take measures for the sale of mortgaged
property unless.its value is greater than the encumbrance. His duties
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relate chiefly to unsecured creditors, and he need not trouble himself
about encumbered property unless something may be realized out of it
on their account, or unless it becomes necessary to do so in order to
ascertain the rights of the secured creditor in the general estate. If he
does, and it becomes necessary to adjust the liens before his sale, he
may institute the necessary proceedings for that purpose in the courts
of the United States, or of the state, as he chooses : Id.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
Requirements of-Rilings of Jndge.-There is but one mode of bring-
ing upon the record and making a part of it the rulings of a judge during
the progress of a trial, or his charge to the jury, and that is by a bill of
exceptions allowed and sealed or signed by the judge : -Phcmni. I4s. Co.
v. Lanier, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The judge's notes do not constitute a bill of exceptions. They are
but memoranda from which a formal bill may afterwards be drawn up
and sealed: Id.
A verdict was returned, and judgment signed on the 14th of November
1874 The transcript exhibited a paper dated November 19th 1874,
called an assignment of error, signed by the attorney of the insurance
company, and filed on that day, setting forth that in the foregoing record
and proceedings various errors appeared, and describing them. The
paper appeared to have been served on the plaintiffs' attorney, and on
the same day it was endorsed "exceptions overruled.-John Erskine,
judge." For what purpose the paper was prepared did not clearly
appear : Reld, that it was impossible to regard it as a bill of exceptions
taken or noted at the trial : Id.
BILL OF LADING. See Shipping.
COLLATERAL WARRANTY. See Covenant
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See TIl.
CONSTITUTIONAL. LAW.
_M1unicipal Corporation-Subscrption, to Stock of Railroad Com-
tpan.y-Aasent of Voters thereto-Provisons of Constitution and Act of
Assembly in relation thereto-Election.-The " township aid act" of
Missouri authorized subscriptions by townships to the capital stock of
railroad companies whenever two-thirds of the qualified voters of the
township, voting at an election called for that purpose should vote in
favor of the subscription. The constitution of the state prohibited such
a subscription " unless two-thirds of the qualified voters of the * * *
town, at a regular or special election to be held therein, shall assent
thereto." Held that the assent required by the constitution was obtained
if two-thirds of those voting at the prescribed election should vote to that
effect; and that the said "township aid act" was constitutional : County
of (ass v. Johnson, S. (. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
All qualified voters who absent themselves from an election duly called
are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those
voting, unless the law providing for the election otherwise declares : Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
CONTRACT. See Mines and Mining.
Parol Evidence to vary written-New Cosideration.-Verbal agree-
ments between the parties to a written contract, made before or at the
time of the execution of the contract, are in general inadmissible to vary
.its terms or to affect its construction, the rule being that all such verbal
agreements are to be considered as merged in the written instrument.
But oral agreements subsequently made on a new and valuable consider-
ation and before the breach of the contract, in cases not falling within
the Statute of Frauds, stand upon a different footing, as such agree-
mets may, if not within the Statute of Frauds, have the effect to enlarge
the time of performance, or may vary any other of its terms, or may
waive and discharge it altogether: Bawkins v. The United States, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term1877.
Implied promises, or promises in law, exist only when there is no,
express promise between the parties, expressum facit cessare tacitum.'
id.'
Time, Essence of the Contract-Sale ;f Contingent Reversionary
.Zhterest in Railway Stock-Return of Deposit.-The defendants, on the
6th day of July 1876, sold to the plaintiff by auction a reversion in
railway stock, expectant on the decease of a married lady without issue
who should attain the age of twenty-one years. The lady was then in
her-forty-fourth year and had never had any children. The sale was
subject to conditions, whereby it was provided that the purchaser should
pay a deposit and the- purchase be coiapleted on or before the 17th
of August then next; "but -should the completion of the purchase be
delayed from any'cause whatever beyond that period, the purchaser is
(but without prejudice nevertheless to vendor's rights under the seventh
or any other condition of sale) to pay interest on- the balance of the
purchase-money from that day until the completion of the purchase."
By the seventh condition, should the purchaser neglect or fail to comply
with any condition, "The deposit money shall be forfeited and the ven-
dor * * * shall be at full liberty to resell the property * * * and the
deficiency (if any) arising by such second sale, together with all charges
attending the same, shall be made good by the defaulter." There was
no express stipulation that time should be of the essence of the con-
tract. The plaintiff at the time of sale paid a deposit of 801. The
defendants were not able to complete the sale on or before the 17th of
August., and the plaintiff, two days afterwards, brought his action to
recover the deposit. The defendants were able and willing to complete
the sale at the end of November 1876: Held, that under the conditions
time was not of the essence of the contract, and the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover: Patrick v. .Milner, Law Rep. 2 0. P. D.
CORPORATION. See Constitutional L;aw.
COURT OF CLAIMS.
Jurisdiction of.--Jurisdiction is not conferred upon the Court of
Claims to allow mere extra allowances in a case where there is no promise
to that effect, either express or implied. Pbwer to hear and determine
claims founded upon any law of Congress or upon any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any contract express or implied with the
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government of the United States, and all claims which may be referred
to it by either house of ('ongrress, is vested in the Court of Claims.
Mere applications flr extra allowance, unsupported by any contract
express or implied muA be made to ('ongress, where alone they can be




Collateral Warranty-Breacli after iSettlcnient of Deceased Covenant-
or's lst(t, -Suit aqahtst Heir-Statute of Limitations-Covenant of
Marri,l lMoman.-A testator dying the owner of a tract of land devised
it to his widow, during her life, with remainder in fee to A. and B., in
common; such widow marrying C., she and C., by a deed containing a
covenant of title, specially binding themselves and their heirs, in stip-
ulated d-unages, for a breach thereof, jointly conveyed such land to
another. who then conveyed it to A.; C. first, and then such widow,
dying, D.. their child, inherited and received an estate from his father,
C.; afterwards, and after the estate of the latter had been finally settled
according t) law, B.. in au action for that purpose against A., obtained
a decree settling in himself the title to and the right of possession of
the undivided half of such land, thus causing a breach of such cove-
nant of title made by C. and his wife, and for which breach A. brought
an action ag-inst D. as the heir of C.: IJchl, on demurrer, that the
right of action for such breach not having accrued until after the final
settlement of C.'s estate, it is not barred, either by such final settlement
nor by the provisions of sections 62 and 178 of the Act of June 17th
1852 (2 R. S. 1876, p. 491), " providing for the settlement of decedents'
estates." &c.; Held, also, that D. is liable,for such breach, in damages
not exceeding the amount of estate received by him of C. ; _1adl, also,
that such covenant is not personal but runs with the land. and a breach
thereof is sufficiently shown by an averment of an eviction of A., by
B., under a paramount title; Ihld, also, that an averment that A. had
been in possession of such land is unnecessary; Ield, also, that it is
unnecessary to aver that D. had had notice of such action by B. against
A. ; J1ld, also, that the fact that a married woman is not bound, by her
covenant, in which her husband joins, in conveying her land, does not
release him : Blair v. Allen, 55 Ind.
CRIMILX% " LAW.
Lzrcenzy--ndictent-Descril)tih of Stolen Prop ery-Elidenee.-
An indictment charging the defendant with having unlawfully and
feloniously stolen, taken and carried away "bank-bills" of a certain
denomination, "a more particular description of which bank-bills cannot
now be given," of a certain value specified, and the property of a person
named, is sufficient on motion to quash : hart v. The State, 55 Ind.
On the trial of the defendant upon such indictment, a conviction upon
evidence describing the property simply as "bills" is erroneous: Md.
The courts of Indiana take judicial notice of the fact that there are
classes of notes and bills, other than bank-bills, in circulation as money:
IM.
False Pretences-Evidence.-C. was convicted of obtaining potatoes
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by falsely pretending that he was then in a large way of business, that
he was in a position to do a good trade in potatoes, and that he was able
to pay for large quantities of potatoes as and when the same might be
delivered to him. The evidence that C. had so pretended was the
following letter written by him to the prosecutor: " Sir, please send me
one truck of Regents and one truck of Rocks as samples, at your prices
named in your letter; let them be good quality, then I am sure a good
trade will be done for both of us. I will remit you cash on arrival of
goods and invoice. Yours, &c. P. S. I may say if you use me well
I shall be a good customer. An answer will oblige, saying when they
are put on." Held, affirming the conviction, that the words of the letter
were fairly and reasonably capable of a construction supporting the pre-
tences charged, and that it was a question for the jury, whether the
writer intended the prosecutor to put that construction upon them: The
Queen v. Cooper, C. C. R., Law Rep. 2 Q. B. D.
CUSTOM. See Mines and Mining ; Sale.
DAMAGES. See Railroad.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Fraud-Assignment of Contract.-If the intent of the assignment of
a contract be to defraud the creditors of the assignor, the assignee can
take nothing thereby, and is not entitled, as against the creditors, to
withhold from the proceeds of the execution of the contract the amount
he may have paid for the assignment: Ghapman v. Ransom, 44 Iowa.
Coiweyance--When Fraudulent-Lien of Judgment.-Whero after
the filing of an opinion in the Supreme Court, affirming a judgment of
the court below, the judgment debtor conveyed a large amount of real
estate to his son and grandchildren, in consideration of love and affection
and a small nominal consideration expressed, and it did not appear that
any consideration was actually paid, it was held that such conveyance
was fraudulent and would not defeat the lien of the judgment: Potter et
al. v. Phillips et al., 44 Iowa.
A fraudulent grantor is not a necessary party to an action against his
grantees to set aside a conveyance alleged to be in fraud of his creditors:
Id.
EL-ETION. See Constitutional Law.
EVIDENCE. See Contract; Criminal Law; Will.
Written Instrument-Parol Evidence-Surrounding Circumstances.-
Although a written agreement cannot be varied (by addition or subtrac-
tion) by proof of the circumstances out of which it grew and which
surrounded its adoption, yet such circumstances are constantly resorted
to for the purpose of ascertaining the subject-matter and the standpoint
of the parties in relation thereto. Without some knowledge derived
from such evidence it would be impossible to comprehend the meaning
of an instrument or the effect to be given to the words of which it is
composed. This preliminary knowledge is as indispensable as that of the
language in which the instrument is written. A reference to the actual
condition of things at the time, as they appeared to the parties them-
selves, is often necessary to prevent the court, in construing their Ian-
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guage, from falling into mistakes and even absurdities: Reed v. Ater-
eh ints' Afutual Ins. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The clause in a policy, "" the risk to be suspended while vessel is at
Baker's Island loading," construed to mean, " while the vessel is at
Baker's Island for the purpose of loading: Id.
Disco.vergy-Priileged Docunzents-Report of Examination of Plain-
tiff by Aedical .Aen.-Where, on an action against a railway company
to recover damages fbr injuries sustained by the defendants' negligence,
the plaintiff is examined by medical men employed on the defendants'
behalf, the reports sent by the medical men to the defendants are priv-
ileged from inspection, provided that the examination and reports were
procured by the defendants' solicitor, or at his instance, for the purpose
of enabling him to give advice to the defendants with reference to the
action, and of assisting him generally in the conduct of the legal pro-
ceedings : Friend v. The London, Chatham & Dover Railway Co., Law
Rep. C. A., 2 Ex. D.
FRAUD. See Debtor and Greditor.
GOVERNMENT. See Officer.
HOMESTEAD.
Dower-Survivor must elect.-The surviving husband or wife cannot
enjoy at the same time both dower or curtesy and homestead in the real
estate of decedent, and must elect which of those rights he or she will
take: Butterfield v. Wcks et al., 44 Iowa.
The continued occupancy of the property by the husband, after the
death of the wife who was the owner, will be regarded as an election to
hold it as a homestead : Id.
The right of occupancy and possession by the survivor confers no title
to the property, and he cannot execute a valid mortgage thereon : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIPE. See Govenant; Homestead.
INSURANCE. See Evidence.
Partial Loss-Cost of Repairs-Allowance of one-third New for Old
-Suing and Laboring Clause-Salvage Expenses.-The defendant
insured the plaintiff for 12001. upon a ship valued at 26001. The ship
encountering rough weather suffered sea damage and incurred salvage
expenses to the amount of 5191. She was repaired, and the result of
the repairs, the ship being an old one, was to make her more valuable
when repaired than she was at the time of the insurance. The defend-
ant, in an action on the policy to recover for a partial loss, contended
that he could not be liable for more than a total loss with benefit of sal-
vage, deducting from such salvage the ship's proportion of salvage and
general average expenses, and that the depreciation in value of the ship
by sea damage, not the cost of the repairs, was the measure of the par-
tial loss: Held, that the cost of repair, making the usual deduction of
one-third new for old, was the measure of the loss, if the ship-owner
elected to repair, and consequently that the assured was entitled to
recover such cost of repair up to the amount insured for, even although
the loss so estimated might amount to more than a total loss with benefit
of salvage: but T7eld, that the assured could not recover under the suing
VOL. XXVI.-9
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and labnring clause in respect of a proportion of the salvage expenses
over and above the 12001, because the damage done to the ship being
so great as already to exhaust the policy, and the assured not having
abandoned, the salvage expenses did not enure to tile benefit of the
underwriter: Lohre v. Aitchison, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. D.
JOINT DEBTORS.
Judgment-Enforcemnent-In an action against joint defendants the
judgment plaintiff may enforce his judgment to its full extent against
either of them at his option : Palner v. Stacy et al.. 44 Iowa.
Where a judgment was obtained against a town fbr injuries caused by
the negligence of the co-defendant, the plaintiff is not compelled to rc-
sort to the property of the latter for the satisfhction of the judgment:
Id.
He may ask a writ of mandamus to compel the levy of a tax for the
payment of the judgment. That the co-detendant has property subject
to execution does not afford'such a remedy as will prevent the granting
of the writ: 1d.
It is no objection to the granting of the writ that it will promote a
circuity of actions: Id.
JUDG3tENX. See Debtor and Oreditor.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Liabilit- of Landlord for ijiury happening to Stranger during Ten-
ancy-Liability, of Lalidlordfbr defective repair of demised louse-
Negligence.-A landlord is liable for an injury to a stranger by the de-
fective repair of demised premises only when he has contracted with the
tenant to repair or when he has been guilty of misfeasance, as, fbr in-
stance, in letting the premises in a ruinous condition : in all other cases
he is exempt from responsibility for accidents happening to strangers
during the tenancy. The defendants let to F. a house by an agreement
in writing, by which F. agreed " to do all necessary repairs to the said
premises except main walls, roof and main timbers." There was no
agreement by the defendants to repair, and the house was in good con-
dition at the time of letting it. Owing to the defendants' negligence
in not repairing a part of the main walls, a chimney-pot, during the ten-
ancy of F., fell upon the plaintiff, who was a servant of F., and injured
"him : Held, that the plaintiff was-not entitled to recover compensation
from the defendants for the injury sustained by him: .N'csion v. The
-zive~pool Brewery Co., Law Rep. 2 C. P. D.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Railroad.
Licensee-In vitation-Cocealed Danger.-A barge of the defendant
being unlawfully navigated on the river T., the plaintiff, a waterman,
complained to the man in charge, who referred him to R., the defendant's
-foreman ; the plaintiff went to the defendant's wharf in order to speak
.to R., and whilst he was there a bale of goods, by the negligence of the
defendant's servants, fell upon him and injured him; the plaintiff had
had no warning that the bale might fall: 11eld, that the plaintiff was
.entitled to maintain an action for the injuries sustained by him. Corby
v. Hill, 4 0. -13. N. S. 556; 27 L. J. 0. P. 318, and Indermau," v.
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Daners, Law Rep I C. P. 274; and on appeal, Law Rep. 2 C. P. 311,
fbllowed: White v. France, Law Rep. 2 C. P. D.
N ' iligen -Sub-contractor wnder Railway Com any-;Cornon Em-
plo~yi'nt.-The plaintiff, a workman in the employ of a contractor
cngi-ge. by the de fbndauts, had to work in a dark tunnel rendered
dLngrous by the passing of trains. After he had been working a fort-
night he was injured by a passing train. The jury found that the
defnilauts in not adopting any precautions for the protection of the
plaintiff had been guilty of negligence. _eld, by the majority of the
court of appeal (CocKnuRN, C. J., 31ELLOit and GROVE, JJ ), reversing
the decision of the Coart of Exchequer, that the plaintiff having' con-
tinued in his employment with full knowledge, could not make the
defendants liable fr an injury arising from danger to which he voluntarily
exposed himiself': JHeld, by XI'si and BAGGALLAY, L. JJ., dis-
senting, that the plaintiff, as servant to the contractor and not to the
defendants, had entered into no contract with the latter which would
modify the ordinary duty of those who carry on a dangerous business
to take reasonable precaution that no one should suffer personal injury
from the manner in which it is carried on ; and that no such contract
shmild be inferred from the plaintiff remaining in his employment:
Woodley v. The ietropolitan District Railway Co., Law Rep. C. A., 2
Ex. D.
.eyligence-Sope )* E'niployment.-The defendant's carman, without
his master's permission, and for a purpose of his own, wholly unconnected
with his master's business, took out the defendant's horse and cart, aild
on his way hom.e negligently ran against the plaintiff's cab and damaged
it. The course of the employment of the carman was that, with the
defendant's horse and cart, he took out beer to customers of the defend-
ant (a brewer), and in returning to the brewery he called for empty
casks wherever they would be likely to be collected, for which he
received from the defendant a gratuity of ld. each. At the time of
the accident the carman had with him two casks which he had picked
up on his return journey at a public house which his master supplied,
and for which he afterwards received the customary 1d. feld, that
the carman had not re-entered upon his ordinary duties at the time of
the accident, and therefore the masterwas not liable : Raynerv. Mitchell,
Law Rep. 2 C. P. D.
MINFS AND ]MINING.
Contract -Renzval of Pillars- Custorn.-The lease of a coal mine
stipulated that the lessee was to leave the mine in good working con-
dition at the expiration of the lease : Held, that he could not remove
the supports and pillars from the mine, even after the supply of coal
was exhausted : Randolph et al. v. ialden et al, 44 Iowa.
A contract cannot be controlled by a custom which the parties have
expressly excluded or which they have excluded by necessary implica-
tion : Id.
ILUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law; Joint Debtors.
Annexation of Territory- (ounty Board-Power qf- Tax-L!june-
tion.Where under the provisions of sections 85 and 86 (1 Rev. Stats.
1876, p. 311) of the Act of March 14th 1867, providing "for the incor-
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poration of cities, &c., the common council of a city has filed its petition
with the proper county board, asking that certain described lands, not
platted, lying contiguous to such city, be annexed thereto, to which it
is averred that the owner will not consent, such board has no power to
order the annexation of a part only of such lands, but must grant or
refuse the prayer of such petition as a whole: City of Peru et al. v.
Bearss et al.) 55 Ind.
An order of such county board, annexing to such city part only of
such lands, is inoperative and void, but is one from which no appeal is
authorized by law : Id.
Where a city has assessed a tax for municipal purposes upon lands
so annexed, its collection may be enjoined and such assessment cancelled,
in an action therefor by the owners : Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Evidence ; Landlord and Tenant M.aster and
Servant; Railroad.
NEW TRIAL. See Verdict.
NOTICE. See Bailment.
OFFICER.
Extent of Authority is matter of Law so as to give Aotice to Persons
dealing with him.-Individuals as well as courts must take notice of the
extent of the authority conferred by law upon a person acting in an offi-
cial capacity, and the rnle applies in such a case that ignorance of the
law furnishes no excuse for any mistake or wrongful act: Hawkins v.
Tize United States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Different rules prevail in respect to the acts and declarations of public
agents from those which ordinarily govern in the case of mere private
agents. Principals in the latter category are in many cases bound by the
acts and declarations of their agents, even where the act or declaration was
done or made without any authority, if it appear that the act was done or
the declaration was made by the agent in the course of his regular employ-
ment, but the government or public authority is not bound in such a
case, unless it manifestly appears that the agent was acting within the
scope of his authority, or that he had been held out as having authority
to do the act or make the declaration for or on behalf of the public
authorities Id.
PATENT.
Prior Invention-Arotice.-Patentees or assignees in a suit for in-
fringement, where the patent described in the bill of complaint is intro-
duced in evidence, are presumed to be the original and first inventors
of the described improvement, and if they have proved the alleged in-
fringement the burden of proof is cast upon the respondents to show
that the patent is invalid, unless the patent is materially defective in
form : Roemer v. Simon et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Parties, defendants, sued as infringers, are not allowed, in an action
at law, to set up the defence of a prior invention, knowledge, or use of
the thing patented, unless they have given notice of such defence in
writing, thirty days before the trial, and have stated in that notice "the
names of the patentees and the dates of their patents alleged to have
been invented, and the names and residences of the persons alleged.to
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have invented or to have had the prior knowledge of the thing patented,
and where and by whom it had been used : Id.
PLEADING.
Bill of Reviezo-Demurrer-Rehearinig, when granted.-The decision
of the court upon the issues of fact, so far as they depend upon the
proofs, are conclusive on a bill of review: Bvffington v. Rarey, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
A general demurrer must be overruled if the pleading demurred .to
contain any good ground to support it: Id.
The granting of a rehearing is always in the sound discretion of the
court, and, therefore, granting or refusing it furnishes no ground of
appeal: Id.
RAILROAD. See Bailment.
Negligence-Rate of Speed.-While unusual speed of railway trains
does not of itself constitute negligence, yet it may be considered with
other circumstances in determining the degree of care exercised: Artz
v. Tie 0., R. I & P. Railroad Co., 44 Iowa.
The questions whether or not there were obstructions obscuring the
sight of an approaching train to one about to drive upon the track, and
whether or not plaintiff was using his senses to avoid danger, are questions
of fact for the jury: Id.
Liability for Malicious Acts of Eniployees-Master and Servant-
Damages-Excessive erdict.-A railway company is liable for the
malicious and criminal acts of their employees toward passengers while
they are executing what they suppose to be the orders of the company,
even though the orders do not in fact contemplate such acts: McKinlay
v. C. & . IF: Railroad Co., 44 Iowa.
Mental anguish arising from the nature and character of the assault
is a proper element of compensatory damages, and the outrage and
indignity which have accompanied an injury are to be estimated, as well
as the physical effects of the injury, even in cases where exemplary
damages do not lie: 1d.
While in actions for damages for. personal injuries, the court is disin-
clined to disturb the verdict of the jury on the ground that it is excessive,
yet it will not permit a verdict to stand which appears to be the result
of passion or prejudice: Id.
Where a passenger seeking to enter a car reserved for ladies was
ejected with violence, whereby he suffered severe bodily injuries
recovered a judgment against the railway company for $12,000, it was
held that the amount should be reduced to $7000: Td.
SALE.
Of Goods- Vendor's Lien- Usage-Banktptcy.-By the usage of
the iron trade warrants for goods " deliverable (F. 0. B.) to A. B., or
their assigns, by endorsement hereon," are considered to pass to the
holders for value free from any vendor's lien. The P. B. Company,
manufacturers of steel rails, contracted with S. & Co., iron merchants,
for the sale of a quantity of rails to be rolled at their works and to be
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delivered t intervals, .payment to be made as to three-fifths at three
days' sight, and as to two-fifths by buyers' acceptances at four months.
On the completion of each portion of goods a warrant for the same in
the above form was sent to S. & Co., with an invoice and drafts for
the purchase-money, -and the goods refhrred to in the warrants were
stacked at the works. In the meantime S. & Co. pledged the several
warrants, and endorsed the same to the plaintiffs. Before the contract
was completed, when only part of the goods were paid for, S. & Co.
became bankrupt, and their acceptances were dishonored. At that
time part of the goods had been dispatched in wagons sent by order of S.
& Co., and were stored in a railway company's warehouse, addressed to
the agents of S. & Co, and part remained stacked at the works: Held,
that, by the usage of the iron trade, as well as by the intention of the
parties as shown by their course of dealing, the plaintiffs, as holders
for value'of the warrants, were entitled to the goods free from any
vendor's lien ; Held, also, that even had the vendors been able to claim
a lien on the undelivered goods, the transit was at an end as regarded
those stored in the warehouse, and their right was gone; Held, also,
that the contract was apportionable, and that the vendors could not
in any event have claimed any lien on that portion of the goods which
had been fully paid for: Merclant Banking Co. of London v. P1hxnix
Bessemer Steel Co.,.Law lRep. 5 Ch. D. (M. R.).
SHIPPING. See Insurance.
Carriage qf Xerciandlise- Warranty of Seaworthness-Ship Sea wor-
thy whilst lying -in Port of Loading, but becoming Jseawortly at time
of sailing on, Voyage witht Cargo on board.-Thc implied warranty of
seaworthiness into which the owner of a ship caters with the owner of
her cargo, attaches at the time when the perils of the intended voyage
commence, that is, when she sets sail with the cargo on board for her
port of destination ; and thir warranty is broken if she is then unfit to
encounter these perils, although she may have been seaworthy whilst
lying in the port of loading, ,ind also at the times of starting from her
anchorage for and arriving at the place of loading appointed by the char-
terer, and of commencing to take on board her cargo. The defendants
were owners of a vessel, and chartered her for a voyage to D., from the
port of S., where she was then lying in a seaworthy condition. Pursuant
to the terms of the charter-party, and by the orders 6f the plaintiff, the
vessel-proceeded to a wharf situate in the port of S., and there loaded
on board n cargo of cement belonging to the plaintiff. At the time she
commenced taking in the cargo she was seaworthy; but by the time of
setting sail on her voyage she had from some unknown cause become
unseaworthy. The defendants were not guilty of negligence in sending
her to sea in the condition in which she then was. Soon after starting
from S. she began to leak; but the wind being fair for the voyage to D.,
the master resolved to keep his course for D., and he was not guilty of
negligence in not returning to S. The vessel did not reach D., but
foundered at sea, and the plaintiff's cargo of cement was totally lost:
Held, that the warranty of seaworthiness implied by law upon entering
into the charter-party had been broken, and that the plaintiff was enti-
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tied to recover the value of the cargo shipped by him on board the ves-
sel : Coln v. Davidson, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. D.
Bill of Lading-Liabilii af Shpowner--" Not accountable for Rust,
Leakaqe or Breakage."-The defendants caused to be shipped on board
the plaintiff's vessel bales of palm baskets and barrels of oil, under a bill
of lading containing the clause, '" not accountable for rust, leakage or
breakage." During-the voyage some of the oil escaped from the barrels
and damaged the palm baskets: 1held, that the clause in the bill of
lading, exempting the plaintiff from responsibility for "leakage," did
not extend to damage caused by the oil which had escaped from the bar-
rels, and that the plaintiff was liable to compensate the defendants for
the injury done to the palm baskets: TArift v. Youle & Co., Law Rep.
2 C. P. D.
SLANDER.
Ii'ords not .Actionable per se- ow made Actionable-Pleadlng.-
Words, not actionable per se, spoken of the chastity of a woman, may be
shown to have been spoken in an actionable sense, by an averment,
either Ist, that they were intended, when used, to impute to her a want
of chastity, or 2d, that, in the place where and at the time when used,
their common meaning was such as to render them, in that locality, ac-
tionable per se : Ennzerson v. farrvel. 55 Ind.
Words not actionable per se, set out in a complaint for slander, with
an averment, that, in the place where and at the time when used, they
had an actionable meaning, are, prima facie, presumed to have been so
intended and understood, without its being so alleged: Id.
Where, in an action for slander, for the speaking of words not action-
able prr se, the complaint contains a sufficient colloquium and innuendo,
and the necessary averment, that, at the place where and at the time
when spoken, they had a provincial, actionable meaning, but does not
name such place, such omission does not render it bad on motion in
arrest of judgment: Id.
That words, actionable p er se, were spoken in the hearing of a third
person need not be alleged in the complaint, but must be proved on the
trial, in an action for slander : 11.
The statute of Indiana, authorizing an action for slander for words
charging a woman with whoredom, is not unconstitutional for want of a
proper title: Id.
STOPPAGE iN TRANSITU. See Sale.
TAX. See .Municipal Coiporation.
TENANT FOR LIFE.
Repairs-Act of God- VWaste-Tinber.-Tenant for life is bound to
keep up improvements, unless destroyed by act of God; but where they
are so destroyed he has no right to cut timber to replace them, or to
replace them out of profits and reimburse himself by sale of the timber.
In either case it is waste: Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind.
The tenant of an estate for life has a right to take, of the timber grow-
ing thereon, sufficient to make all necessary repairs which he, as such
tenant, is bound to make; but, unless it is clearly the most economical
mode of making such repairs, he has no right to exchange it for lumber
with which to make such repairs : Id.
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That the tenant of an estate for life, At his own, expense, has made
valuable improvements thereon, which he was not bound to make, is no
ground of defence or recoupment in an action against him, by the re-
versioner, for waste in selling the timber growing thereon : Id.
'TIME. See Contract
TOWN. See Joint Debtors.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
Office of Trustee-Nature of Duties..-The office of a trustee is im-
portant to the community at large, and frequently most so to those least
able to take care of themselves. It is one of confidence. The law
regards the incumbent with jealous scrutiny, and frowns sternly at the
slightest attempt to pervert his powers and duties for his own benefit.
'The tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord. A mu1lto fortiori.
ought not the trustee to be permitted to deny that of his beneficiary:
Union, Pacific Railroad Co. v. Durant, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
USAGE. See MAines and .Xfining; Sale.
VERDICT. See Railroad.
Reduction of Amount.-Where the verdict in an action for damages
is deemed by the court ejcessive, it, may impose upon the successful
party the alternative of accepting a reduced amount, or of submitting
to a new trial: Voel v. Dubuque,, Bellevue & XAississipi R, Co., 44
Iowa.
Upon the return of a verdict the court ordered the amount to be re-
duced, but refused to grant a new trial, upon the refusal of the success-
ful party to accept the amount named, whereupon it was held that the
Supreme Court might remand the case with directions that the party
recovering be allowed to accept the sum first fixed by the court, or that,
in the event of his refusal, the verdict be set aside: Id.
WASTE. See Tenant for LAfe.
WILL.
Law of Place Intention of Testator as to' .Eecution-Parol Evidence
of.-Though the last will of a testator may have been executed and
attested in another, state, yet, if he did while domiciled in this state, the
law of the latter must be applied by her courts in determining whether
such will has been duly executed: Patterson et al. v. Ransom, 55 Ind.
The execution of his last will, by the testator, having been attested by
but one witness, such testator afterwards, at a different place, and in the
absence of such witness, executed an endorsement upon the back of such
will, reading, "The within is the basis on which I desire to have my
affairs disposed of, should no other will be made by me," which endorse-
ment was attested by another witness, to whom its contents had been
made known, and the signatures to such will exhibited, by such testator:
field, in an action to contest the validity and resist the probate of such
will, that it had not been executed in the' presence of two witnesses
according to law and is therefore invalid ; feld, also, that it can not be
established by parol evidence, that the signature of such witness, to such
endorsement, was intended by the testator, and executed by such witness,
as an attesting of such will : 11.
